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ABSTRACT 
Blockchain technology claims to disrupt the existing financial system, 
the way of doing business, and to empower ordinary citizens against an 
elitist economy through decentralization of the decision-making process. 
In the political arena, the disruptive ideology branded as ‘populism’ 
challenges the neo-liberal establishment. By appealing to peoples’ fears, 
frustrations, and dissatisfaction with the political elites, exploiting distrust 
in the so-called establishment, populism claims to deliver more power to 
the people.  
In this article, we draw a parallel between core foundations of 
political populism and those of blockchain and propose a theory of 
technological populism. Technological populism as reflected by 
blockchain platforms exploits the rhetoric of empowering the 
disenfranchised through decentralized decision-making process, enabling 
anonymity of transactions, dehumanizing trust (promoting trust in 
computation rather than trust in humans and institutions) as well as 
breaking the monopoly in the financial system and money supply.  The 
rhetoric of empowering the disenfranchised against financial elites is not 
only propaganda but also a method of accumulating wealth for 
technocratic elites.  
Ultimately, the blockchain and cryptocurrency world has perfected 
what political populists have pioneered — unrealistic promises, turning 
the citizen against “the elites” only so long as they are not the elites in 
charge. 
Key Words: Technological Populism, Populism, Distributed 
Digital Ledger (DLT), Bitcoin, Democracy, Blockchain, Cryptocurrencies, 
Anarchy, Political Promises  
1. INTRODUCTION 
When Bitcoin was launched in 2009, there was great enthusiasm for 
its potential. Today, cryptocurrencies and blockchain transcended the 
sphere of peer-to-peer online payment and have become a multi-billion 
dollar industry.1  Bitcoin could replace fiat money,2 could bank the 
                                                          
1 As of April 25, 2019, the total market capitalization for cryptocurrencies is over $ 170 
Billion.  Cryptolization, retrieved from <https://cryptolization.com/> accessed 25 April 
2019.  
2 Frank Holmes, ‘Bitcoin could replace cash in 10 years’ Business Insider (1 May 2018), 
retrieved from <https://www.businessinsider.com/bitcoin-might-replace-cash-10-
years-2018-5?IR=T> accessed 23 February 2019. 
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unbanked,3 while blockchain could revolutionize finance, could help in 
fighting against poverty,4 could be used to safeguard the environment and 
combat climate change.5 These are just some of the claims made by 
entrepreneurs, industry experts, advocates, intellectuals, and the media in 
regard to cryptocurrencies and blockchain. With cryptocurrencies failing 
to deliver on their promises of replacing fiat currencies and tripartite 
payments systems,6 the enthusiasts shifted their focus from the 
currency/payment aspect to blockchain as a malleable Distributed Ledger 
Technology (DLT) with various applications across industries.7  
The past ten years have also revealed many direct or indirect 
challenges facing the technology, ranging from fraudulent practices in 
crowd financing of various projects linked to the technology to its use for 
criminal activities. A report published in 2018 shows that 80% of the 
                                                          
3 Paul Vigna and Michael J. Casey, ‘Bitcoin for the Unbanked: Cryptocurrencies That Go 
Where Big Banks Won’t, Foreign Affairs’ (Foreign Affairs, 25 October 2017), retrieved 
from  <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/sponsored/bitcoin-unbanked>  accessed 6 July 
2018; Steve Forbes, ‘How Bitcoin Will End World Poverty’ Forbes (02 April 2015, 
retrieved from  <https://www.forbes.com/sites/steveforbes/2015/04/02/how-
bitcoin-will-end-world-poverty/#62cee38f2a5a> accessed 6 July 2018 & George 
Basiladze, ‘How Cryptocurrencies Can Help Bank the Unbanked’ (FIN. MAGNETS, 16 
August 2015), retrieved from 
<https://www.financemagnates.com/cryptocurrency/bloggers/how-cryptocurrencies-
can-help-bank-the-unbanked/> accessed 6 July 2018. 
4 Gillian Tett, ‘Bitcoin, blockchain and the fight against poverty’ The Financial Times (22 
December 2017), retrieved from <https://www.ft.com/content/60f838ea-e514-11e7-
8b99-0191e45377ec> accessed 29 June 2018. 
5 Anteneh Tesfaye ‘Blockchain is Here and it’s Changing The World’ Data Driven 
Investor (Oct 15, 2018), retrieved from 
<https://medium.com/datadriveninvestor/blockchain-is-here-and-its-changing-the-
world-c54dd401695e?sk=546aacee45e899cb78ed0217c9eeab45> 23 February 2019. 
6 Yuwa Hedrick-Wong ‘Cryptocurrencies Have Failed, And Blockchain Still Has Yet To 
Be Proven Useful’ Forbes (Nov. 11 2018), retrieved from 
<https://www.forbes.com/sites/yuwahedrickwong/2018/11/11/cryptocurrencies-
have-failed-and-blockchain-still-has-yet-to-find-its-use/#7a214b02406c> accessed 25 
April 2019. 
7 I. Kiviat Trevor, ‘BEYOND BITCOIN: ISSUES IN REGULATING BLOCKCHAIN 
TRANSACTIONS’ 65 Duke Law Journal 569, p. 570. ‘…—the true innovation behind 
the Bitcoin protocol. Simply, blockchain technology solves an elusive networking 
problem by enabling “trustless” transactions: value exchanges over computer networks 
that can be verified, monitored, and enforced without central institutions (for example, 
banks). This has broad implications for how we transact over electronic networks.’ 
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Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) (a method of crowdfunding for blockchain-
based projects)8 were fraudulent.9  
Blockchain’s ability to revolutionize finance, data sharing and even 
combating poverty or preserving the environment has been discussed 
often by employing optimistic rhetoric. However, potential is not a 
substitute for facts. Similarly, the claim of empowering ordinary citizens 
against elitist economy and institutions through decentralization across 
sectors lies at the heart of the campaign for blockchain. Nevertheless, the 
technology’s promise of easy solutions to multifaceted societal challenges 
is nothing more than demagoguery and a business opportunity. The 
technology that should have significantly disrupted the old economic and 
financial establishment has made many people rich (or richer), but failed 
to deliver on its original promises.   
In the political sphere, there is a similar phenomenon. The neo-
liberal establishment is being challenged by a disruptive political 
movement or ideology labeled as “populism”. Appealing to peoples’ fears, 
frustrations, and dissatisfaction with the political elites, populism claims 
to deliver more power to the people and to reconnect political 
representatives with their constituencies. However, the leaders of the 
populist camp either promise the impossible or fail to deliver on them.  
In this article, we postulate that there is a close association between 
blockchain technology and populism at a conceptual level and investigate 
the common traits between blockchain and cryptocurrencies, on the one 
hand, and political populism, on the other. 
In order to do so, we propose a new concept - “technological 
populism,” — to refer to the phenomenon by which technological 
innovations that promise and promote disruptive effects as societal 
benefits and claim to solve pressing socio-economic problems by 
                                                          
8 Initial Coin Offering (ICO) is a scheme whereby an entity promoting a new 
cryptocurrency or crypto-asset raises money from the public where investors are usually 
issued a token that entitles them to different kinds of rights such as the right to profit 
sharing and voting in the entity issuing the token. See A. Sehra, P. Smoth & P. Gomes, 
‘Economics of Initial Coin Offerings’ (Allen & Overy, 01 August 2017) 2 
<http://www.allenovery.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/ICO-Article-Nivaura-
20170822-0951%20%20-%20Final%20Draft.pdf > accessed 6 July 2018 &  A. Majumda, 
‘A Regulatory Outlook on Initial Coin Offerings’ (Oxford Business Law Blog, 03 August 
2017), retrieved from <https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-
blog/blog/2017/08/regulatory-outlook-initial-coin-offerings>  accessed 6 July 2018. 
9 Shobhit Seth, ‘$9 Million Lost Each Day in Cryptocurrency Scams’ (Investopedia, 2 
April 2 2018), retrieved from <https://www.investopedia.com/news/80-icos-are-
scams-report%20/> accessed 17 October 2018.    
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empowering the ‘disenfranchised’ and replacing the ‘elites’ are ‘hyped’10 
for the economic and commercial benefits of a select few.  
Blockchain’s promise of a simple solution to complex problems, just 
like what “populists” promise in politics, is used to create a temporary 
alliance with ordinary citizens in order to convince them to invest money 
in a system run by invisible entities distributed across a network of nodes. 
Institutions that oversee the market and are generally adamant about 
populism, embraced this ‘populist’ innovation. Intellectuals and 
businessmen, who are otherwise critical about simple solutions to complex 
societal problems, paradoxically ignore or minimize the risks to 
consumers, for the rule of law and even for the environment. By the time 
the true nature of the technology was revealed, some of the advocates of 
the technology have made fortunes.11 We name this category of blockchain 
advocates and profiteers  ‘technological populists.’  
By taking an interdisciplinary and cross-jurisdictional approach, we 
methodically extract the core elements of political populism and populist 
rhetoric and juxtapose them with ideals of cryptocurrencies and 
blockchain to argue that both employ demagoguery to grab power and 
control. We do not discuss the legitimate and limited use cases of 
blockchain12 as that goes beyond the scope and purpose of our analysis. 
We focus instead on the problematic aspects of blockchain to shed a light 
on how society should see new technologies that over-promise without 
reasonable demonstration of their value to society. The notion of 
technological populism is therefore used pejoratively to describe digital 
                                                          
10 The verb ‘hype’ is defined by Cambridge English Dictionary as “a situation in which 
something is advertised and discussed in newspapers, on television, etc. a lot in order to 
attract everyone’s interest”, while as a noun, it means “information that makes something 
seem very important or exciting (many times more than it is). For a full list of meanings: 
<https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/hype> accessed 28 April 2019. 
11 Satoshi Nakamoto, who to this date remains anonymous and who wrote the white 
paper for bitcoin, has earned an estimated $19 Billion from cryptocurrencies making 
him/her the number profiteer of the technology.  Cherry Reynard, ‘Who are the richest 
cryptocurrency investors?’ The Telegraph (25 May 2018), retrieved from 
<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/digital-money/richest-crypto-investors/> 
accessed 25 April 2019.  
12 Blockchain could be used for tracking goods in a supply chain. It can also be used to 
manage data in a decentralized manner. Nevertheless, even these use cases are not proven 
to be efficient and effective as researchers are still exploring the potential of the 
technology.  See Yoav Vilner ‘5 Blockchain Product Use Cases To Follow This Year’ 
Forbes (June 27, 2018), retrieved from 
<https://www.forbes.com/sites/yoavvilner/2018/06/27/5-blockchain-product-use-
cases-to-follow-this-year/#500bce621b60> accessed 28 April 2019.  
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innovations that do not solve genuine social problems, but rather serve 
the interest of specific stakeholders.  
The article is divided into three sections. Section one briefly explains 
political populism and extrapolates its core principles that can be used to 
explain blockchain demagoguery. It also introduces the definition of 
blockchain and cryptocurrencies to provide background information to 
the reader. Section two explains the core features of blockchain and 
cryptocurrencies that embody populist principles and undertones. Section 
three provides an explanation for the rise of technological populism. The 
paper concludes with a call for technological populism consciousness. 
2.  POPULISM AND BLOCKCHAIN - AN OVERVIEW 
Populism and blockchain (or any other digital technology) seem to 
have remote connections. A closer inspection reveals otherwise. In this 
section, we provide a necessary overview of the two concepts.  
2.1.1. WHAT IS POLITICAL POPULISM?  
Populism is undoubtedly one of the most widely used terms by 
political commentators, both at national and international level. The term 
is associated with both conservative and right-wing politicians, such as 
Donald Trump (USA), Nigel Farage (the UK), Matteo Salvini (Italy) or 
Viktor Orban (Hungary) and left-wing movements such as Syriza 
(Greece), Podemos (Spain) or leaders Hugo Chavez (Venezuela), Jeremy 
Corbyn (the UK) or even the US Senator Elizabeth Warren. Given that 
one cannot define or attribute populism to a certain side of the political 
spectrum,13 it becomes important to determine its characteristics, rather 
than confine it within the political manifestations associated with it. 
Populism is “a complex phenomenon deeply connected with 
democracy [...] a modality of social expression of ‘popular sovereignty’, 
which acquires different forms, but has specific traits that are determined 
by the social conditions of the context where it manifests itself.”14 
Nowadays, the process of globalization, the increased interconnectivity, 
the creation of new social spaces and forms for politics and social 
consensus have given birth to new forms of populism,15 such as media 
populism, web-populism, or tele-populism.16 To these, we add 
technological populism. 
                                                          
13 J.W. Müller, What Is Populism? (Penguin Books Limited 2017), p viii. 
14 M. Anselmi and L.F. Morrisey, Populism: An Introduction (Routledge 2017), p 2. 
15 C. Mudde and C.R. Kaltwasser, Populism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University 
Press 2017), p 6. 
16 Anselmi and Morrisey, p 3. 
71 TECHNOLOGICAL POPULISM AND ITS ARCHETYPES 
Before delving into the intricacies of technological populism, one 
should first determine the building-blocks of political populism.17 And, in 
order to understand how political populism came to be the buzz-word it 
is nowadays, 18 one must look at the social and institutional crisis that 
precedes it. Populism is mainly the reaction to an established (and 
potentially declining) elite,19 an attempt to mobilize excluded sectors of 
society for one main purpose: disrupting the status quo20 and replacing the 
elite with a new one (the populists).21  
From this perspective, three major building blocks can be 
distinguished.  The first building block is an interclass homogenous group 
of people22 that perceives itself as the absolute holder of ‘popular 
sovereignty’ expressing an anti-establishment23 attitude and portraying 
itself as an alternative to the pre-existing elite (anti-pluralist24). This group 
may or may not have a leader voicing the group’s message. The second is 
the challenged elite, be it another group of people, another party, an 
institution, or even a class. The third, and maybe most important, a 
discursive, argumentative, Manichean style of communication where the 
group is referring to itself as ‘us’ and to those challenged as ‘them’25. This 
                                                          
17 Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser, How to define populism? Reflections on a contested 
concept and its (mis)use in the social sciences, in G. Fitzi, J. Mackert and B.S. Turner, 
Populism and the Crisis of Democracy: Volume 1: Concepts and Theory (Taylor & Francis 2018), 
pp 64-65. 
18 Mudde and Kaltwasser, p 1. 
19 Anselmi and Morrisey, p 4. 
20 Mudde and Kaltwasser, pp. 3, 18. 
21 Müller, p 29. Muller notices here one of the inherent paradoxes of populism. Populists 
do not have a problem with representation as long as they are the representatives and 
they are fine with elites leading people, as long as they are those elites. Same observation 
is made by Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser, How to define populism? Reflections on a 
contested concept and its (mis)use in the social sciences, in Fitzi, Mackert and Turner, p 
74. 
22 For more considerations regarding the concept of ‘the people’ Mudde and 
Kaltwasser9-11. Also: Müller, pp 22-23. 
23 For more considerations regarding the concept of ’the elite’ Mudde and Kaltwasser, 
pp 11-16. 
24 Müller, p 101 
25 According to another view, the three core elements of populism are ’the people’, ’the 
elite’ and ’the general will’, the latter being defined as the capacity of people to join 
together into a community and legislate to enforce their common interests. The concept 
of general will, however, is centered around the populist leader capable of identifying, 
triggering and channeling the general will, Mudde and Kaltwasser, p 16. Thus, while 
named different, we perceive these core elements as being fundamentally the same as 
those employed in the main text. A detailed discussion on various theories proposed is 
provided by Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser, How to define populism? Reflections on a 
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discourse is aimed at creating political polarization,26 which can then be 
further used for political support. All the above will feed in a constant 
social attitude against the elite or any form of intermediation27 (generally, 
but necessarily, institutional).28  
The idea of defining populism by using common traits is not new.29 
Since it would be beyond the paper’s purpose to propose a new political 
theory of populism, we will refer to previous research instead. Among the 
long list of potential traits that have been advanced some capture our 
attention: populism is more moralistic than programmatic,30 it is always 
anti-establishment and against the ruling elite, it is subjected to corruption 
and burgeoisification processes, it often demonizes financiers, it can be 
urban, or it opposes social and economic inequalities produced by 
institutions, but it accepts those related to tradition and lifestyle (its ‘own’ 
meritocracy). As the concrete examples in subsection 1.3 reveal, all these 
traits are easily identifiable in the blockchain manifestos and, thus, can be 
said to define technological populism as well.  
We started this section by noting that populism has manifested itself 
on both ends of the political spectrum31. This constant oscillation between 
Left and Right is confusing in regard to the nature of populist ideology, 
which led certain scholars to argue that populism is not a self-standing 
ideology, but a discursive form that can complement and accommodate 
various political views32.  
Laclau, for instance, argued that populism is a discursive logic 
centred on the rhetorical appeals to “the people” against common 
enemies, regularly identified with unresponsive institutions,33 financial 
institutions, or concentrated groups of economic and political power 
(referred to as ‘elite’, ‘oligarchy’ or ‘establishment’).34 His point, however, 
                                                          
contested concept and its (mis)use in the social sciences, in Fitzi, Mackert and Turner, 
pp 64-66. 
26 Anselmi and Morrisey, p 8, Mudde and Kaltwasser, p 6, Müller, p 3. 
27 Anselmi and Morrisey, p 29. 
28 For instance, in political populism the idea is that ‘the people’ should take the most 
important decisions instead of delegating them to the parliament, while in the aftermath 
of the financial crisis and the wake of Bitcoin, the idea is to disrupt financial institutions. 
29 Anselmi and Morrisey, pp 21-22. 
30 Müller, pp 3, 19. On the meaning of morality in populism, Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser, 
How to define populism? Reflections on a contested concept and its (mis)use in the social 
sciences, in Fitzi, Mackert and Turner, p. 66. 
31 P. Gerbaudo, The Mask and the Flag: Populism, Citizenism, and Global Protest (Oxford 
University Press 2017), p. 73. 
32 Ibid 73. 
33 E. Laclau, On Populist Reason (Verso Books 2018), p. unavailable (online source). 
34 Gerbaudo, p. 77, Mudde and Kaltwasser, p. 5. 
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was that populism could serve as a positive force in organizing excluded 
sections of society to pursue political and socioeconomic integration,35 a 
view which, as we will show, is very common in the discourse surrounding 
blockchain technology and technological populism.  
Recent theories place even more emphasis on the communicative 
nature of populism. According to these views, populism is a “rhetorical 
macro-device that asserts itself” and “operates in an attempt to overturn 
the people’s subalternity to the dominant social class”. These views still 
revolve the dichotomy between ‘the people’ and the ‘elite’, nevertheless, 
in this narrative, the people’s attitude and (re)action is the result of a 
specific communicative strategy,36 which can easily transform into 
manipulation. In our opinion, extrapolating these views and applying them 
to the so-called ‘blockchain revolution’, would explain the ‘hype’ around 
the ‘buzz word’. As shown in subsection 1.3, blockchain manifestos are 
not technological or programmatic documents, but mainly 
communication strategies meant to attract supporters and create a 
polarization that keeps the ‘hype’ real.  Nothing seems to be more effective 
to this end, than resorting to populist rhetoric.  
This is not to say that populism is merely an issue of style or form, 
without its own substantive content, or that it constitutes a completely 
negative phenomenon. On the contrary. Revolving around ‘the people’ – 
whoever they may be – the principle of popular sovereignty is central to 
populist discourse37 in both politics and technology, as both claim to 
return power to its original owners by removing it from the hands of 
illegitimate profiteers, be it an elite or an intermediary institution. It is a 
reaction to social issues and has a corrective potential for any type of 
politics that is disconnected from ‘the people’.38 This allows certain 
politicians to proudly claim they are populist, as long as populism infers 
working for the people and reveals a particular issue of distinguishing 
between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ populism.39 
For instance, Satoshi Nakamoto’s Bitcoin manifesto starts with what 
could be labelled and interpreted as ‘populist’ statement, given that later it 
was used as basis for most blockchain manifestos: “A purely peer-to-peer 
                                                          
35 Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser, How to define populism? Reflections on a contested 
concept and its (mis)use in the social sciences, in Fitzi, Mackert and Turner, p. 63. 
36 Anselmi and Morrisey, p. 43. 
37 Gerbaudo, p. 74. 
38 Cas Mudde and Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser (eds) cited by Müller, p 8. 
39 Ibid 9-11.  Such division is more easily identifiable on the two shores of the Atlantic. 
While populism is perceived as somewhat progressive and egalitarian in the Americas, in 
Europe it entails solely demagoguery and irresponsible politics. 
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version of electronic cash would allow online payments to be sent directly 
from one party to another without going through a financial institution.”40 
The statement’s content, although disruptive in effect, does not target 
directly the financial industry. Yet, other blockchain manifestos do.  
Two problems arise, which constitute the main paradoxes of 
populism. On the one hand, such social support in favour of either 
political or technological populism based on communication strategies 
lacks substance. Although populists portray themselves as anti-
establishment and anti-elite, that ends when they become the 
establishment or the elite.41 On the other hand, its message can be easily 
(mis)appropriated and marketed as being for the people, while, in reality, 
it creates more wealth for the very ‘elite’ it allegedly tries to fight. The best 
example is the election of Trump. Although himself a poster image of 
capitalism, and thus a member of the ‘elite’, he managed to present himself 
as an anti-systemic candidate and made it to the Oval Office. Nevertheless, 
his election simply meant replacing the political elite with the economic 
one, thus perfectly illustrating how the capitalist class can control the 
political narrative and maintain its direct rule and domination over 
politics42 by merely employing the recipe of disruptive discourse of 
populism.43  
As indicated, we believe the traits of populism can be extrapolated 
from the purely political sphere and applied to technology as well. The 
postulate that discursive elements and paradoxes associated with populism 
are easily identifiable in the discourse of technological disruption as well 
will be proved by resorting to examples of technological speech regarding 
blockchain technology. But before delving into the rhetorical similarities 
of political and technological populism, we must first explain what 
blockchain is.  
                                                          
40 Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, p. 1, retrieved 
from  <https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf>, accessed 5 April 2019. 
41 See supra fn 9. 
42 Panayota Gounari, Authoritarianism, Discourse and Social Media: Trump as the 
‘American Agitator’ in J. Morelock, Critical Theory and Authoritarian Populism (University of 
Westminster Press 2018), pp. 208, 221. Also Müller, pp 29-30 and Cristobal Rovira 
Kaltwasser, How to define populism? Reflections on a contested concept and its (mis)use 
in the social sciences, in Fitzi, Mackert and Turner, p 67. 
43 Morelock, p 209. 
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2.2. WHAT IS BLOCKCHAIN?  
Blockchain is a distributed digital ledger (database),44 which records 
transactions on a chain of blocks, in the order in which the transactions 
occurred.45 The technology emerged from the first cryptocurrency—
Bitcoin. Cryptocurrency is “a system of currency that uses cryptography 
to allow secure transfer and exchange of digital tokens in a distributed and 
decentralized manner.”46  Thus, while cryptocurrencies are digital 
currencies or assets47, blockchain is a distributed database where those 
assets are generated, stored, and transacted on. 
 Once a transaction is initiated on a blockchain, it must be approved 
by the majority of nodes (computers) in the network through a 'consensus 
mechanism'. Regarding the work model adopted by Bitcoin, consensus is 
established by the node being able to solve an automatically generated 
mathematical puzzle.48 Solving the puzzle entitles the miner (‘transaction 
validator’) to reward crypto-asset(s). Regarding the stake model, generally, 
the node with higher stake (‘ownership’) has a higher chance to validate 
transactions and claim the reward.49  
                                                          
44 Robby HOUBEN & Alexander SNYERS, ‘Cryptocurrencies and blockchain: Legal 
context and implications for financial crime, money laundering and tax evasion’ (2018) 
PE 619.024, 15, retrieved from 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/150761/TAX3%20Study%20on%20crypto
currencies%20and%20blockchain.pdf>accessed 20 October 2018.  
45 Chuen David Lee Kuo, Handbook of digital currency : Bitcoin, innovation, financial instruments, 
and big data (9780128023518 
9780128021170, 2015), p. 49. See also Pierluigi Cuccuru, ‘Beyond bitcoin: an early 
overview on smart contracts’ 25 International Journal of Law and Information 
Technology 179, pp. 1, 4. 
46 Eli Dourado and Jerry Brito, ‘Cryptocurrency: From the New Palgrave Dictionary of 
Economics’ (2014, Online Edition) 1, retrieved from <https://coincenter.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/05/cryptocurrency-article.pdf> accessed 28 October 2018. 
There are over 2000 cryptocurrencies (or digital tokens created by cryptography) in the 
market today. Cryptocurrency Market Capitalization, retrieved from 
<https://coinmarketcap.com/all/views/all/> accessed 22 September 2017. 
47 Also called ‘crypto-assets’. Crypto-asset is a term that refers to all cryptographic assets 
including cryptocurrencies and cryptographic tokens that are ill-suited to bear the name 
cryptocurrency as they are neither designed to be currencies, nor function as one in 
practice. Kevin Kim, ‘What is Cryptocurrency & Why the Term Doesn’t Apply to Most 
Coins & Tokens Today’ (The Blockchain Review, 02 July 2018), retrieved from  
<https://blockchainreview.io/what-is-cryptocurrency-coin-token-bitcoin-ethereum/> 
accessed 19 November 2018. 
48 The process is known as mining. Robby HOUBEN & Alexander SNYERS (n 22). 
49 Ibid. Also Mike Orcutt, ‘Bitcoin uses a massive amount of energy — but there's a plan 
to fix that’ Business Insider (19 Nov. 2017), retrieved from 
<https://www.businessinsider.com/Bitcoin-uses-massive-amounts-of-energy-plan-to-
fix-it-2017-11?IR=T> accessed 19 November 2018.  
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Based on access, blockchain can be classified into two, i.e., 
permissionless and permission blockchain. A permissionless blockchain 
lacks oversight, planning, and control by a central authority.50 In 
‘permissionless' blockchain, transaction validators can join the network 
without a need for approval by a central authority,51 whereas in 
‘permission’ blockchain, joining the network requires approval by the 
entity running the network.52  
Originally, Bitcoin, being based on permissionless blockchain, was 
meant to be ‘peer-to-peer decentralized electronic cash’ with no 
intermediary involved in facilitating transactions.53 Cryptocurrency 
exchange platforms, as intermediaries, emerged to accommodate the 
needs of users who were not able to transact directly on the blockchain or 
wished to trade on organized platforms. Exchange platforms buy and sell 
cryptocurrencies and, in most cases, provide custodial digital wallet 
services.54 Some platforms exchange cryptocurrencies only for other 
cryptocurrencies, while others convert cryptocurrencies also to fiat 
currencies and vice-versa.55  
 During earlier times, while blockchain-based assets were created 
mainly to facilitate payment, even claiming to be alternative currencies, 
improvements to the technology gave rise to different types of blockchain-
based assets, mainly classified as ‘pure currency tokens’, ‘utility tokens’, 
‘investment tokens’, and ‘hybrid tokens’, each serving different purposes 
and triggering the application of  different legal rules.  
Each of the blockchain-based assets is created with a certain degree 
of rebellion against the existing system that it aspires to replace. Section 2 
explains in detail how this aspect of blockchain technology and its failure 
to achieve its self-proclaimed goals make the technology akin to political 
populism.  
                                                          
50 John Blocke, ‘Decentralization Fetishism is Hindering Bitcoin’s Progress', (Medium 6 
July 2017), retrieved from <https://medium.com/@johnblocke/decentralization-
fetishism-is-hindering-Bitcoins-progress-11cfa5c7964d>accessed 09 September 2017. 
51 Robby HOUBEN & Alexander SNYERS, supra fn. 44.  
52 Ibid. 
53 Satoshi Nakamoto, ‘Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System’ (2008), retrieved 
from <https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf> accessed 23 February 2019.  
54 Robby HOUBEN & Alexander SNYERS, supra fn. 44.  
55 Ibid. 
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2.3. BLOCKCHAIN AND POPULISM—CONCEPTUAL AND RHETORICAL 
ASSOCIATIONS  
Having defined political populism and blockchain, we will now 
return to the conceptual and rhetorical associations between them, in 
order to determine the existence of technological populism. In subsection 
1.1, we have established that the concept of populism is determined by the 
existence of three building blocks: ‘the people’, ‘the elite’, and ‘a disruptive 
discourse’ by which ‘the people’ challenge and try to replace ‘the elite’. We 
also showed that the disruptive discourse employs Manichean, anti-
pluralist rhetoric. This subsection proves that all the above characterize 
the ‘blockchain revolution’ discourse, by highlighting them in the 
blockchain manifestos advanced by technological pundits.  
According to Nakamoto’s Bitcoin manifesto, the main purpose of 
Bitcoin was to provide “a solution to the double-spending problem” and 
that of “a trusted third party”, meaning a solution by which the 
intermediary would be removed from the transaction.56 While not a direct 
attack on banks and financial institutions, one cannot ignore the 
conspicuous disruptive effects Bitcoin was intended to have on the 
banking system, especially in the light of the blockchain manifestos that 
followed. Once removed from handling transactions, banks would lose a 
significant amount of revenues, while states would lose the capacity to 
supervise financial transactions if parties were to choose to remain 
anonymous. 
A stronger populist message can be identified in the Blockchain 
manifesto of Naval Ravikant.57 The manifesto is conceived in 37 points, 
following a logical sequence. The starting point is that “Blockchain will 
replace networks with markets”58, thus creating the premises of 
polarization: ‘blockchain’ versus ‘networks.’ It goes on to argue that 
“Networks must be organized according to rules: and require “Rulers to 
enforce these rules”.59 As networks “create a winner-take-all dynamic”60, 
the “Rulers of these networks become the most powerful people in 
society”.61 In other words, networks generate the same type of phenomena 
witnessed in society and politics, leading to the creation of oligarchs and 
                                                          
56 Id. at 1. 
57 Naval Ravinkant, Blockchain Manifesto, retrieved from: 
https://medium.com/koinok/blockchain-manifesto-by-naval-ravikant-insightful-read-
4cc793606a0c, accessed 5 April 2019. 
58 Id at point 1. 
59 Id at point 7.  
60 Id at point 8. 
61 Id at point 9.  
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unaccountable elites. Who are they? The answer depends on the type of 
network: “kings and priests”,62 “corporations”,63 “elites (doctors, 
academics, bankers)”,64 “dictators”,65 “mobs”,66 “markets (credit, stock, 
commodities, money markets)”.67 The Blockchain manifesto argues that 
its own rise will replace all these inefficient, abusive, dangerous, powerful 
and unmeritorious networks with a new one “that allows meritorious 
participants in an open network to govern without a ruler and without 
money.”68 Put simply, the rhetoric advertises replacing the network elite, 
with the blockchain one. 
The Blockchain manifesto resorts to populistic discourse to advance 
its own agenda and advertise a profound technological revolution: 
“Blockchains’ open and merit-based markets can replace networks 
previously run by kings, corporations, aristocracies, and mobs”.69 In this 
sentence, one can identify all traits of the populist rhetoric: blockchain 
generated open and merit markets (‘the people’), and kings, corporations, 
aristocracies and mobs (‘the established elite’). The manifesto concludes 
with a typical disruptive message associated with the populist movement: 
“Blockchains give us new ways to govern networks. For banking. For 
voting. For search. For social media. For phone and energy grids. 
Networks governed without kings, priests, elites, corporations, and mobs. 
Networks governed by anyone with merit to the network.”70 These restate 
Laclau’s point of view71 according to which populism could serve as a 
positive force in organizing excluded sections of society to pursue political 
and socioeconomic integration. Only that in the cited manifesto, populism 
was replaced with blockchains. 
This message is reiterated in the Ten Principles advanced by the 
“Blockchain for Good” movement.72 The populist antagonism with the 
oligarchy, referred to as “the privileged” or “the select few” is 
omnipresent. To take some examples: 1) “for far too long, power has been 
                                                          
62 Id at point 10. 
63 Id at point 11. 
64 Id at point 12. 
65 Id at point 14. 
66 Id at point 13. 
67 Id at point 17. 
68 Id at point 20. 
69 Id at point 30 
70 Id at points 33-34. 
71 Supra fn. 35. 
72 Retrieved from < https://www.blockchainforgood.com/manifesto-1> accessed 5 
April 2019. 
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mediated by the select few […] it is time to take back control”;73 2)  “old 
value is controlled […] by the privileged, the select few” […] Blockchain 
passes value through to the people, […] the incentive is upon us all, not 
for the select few”;74 3) “old prosperity is wealth […] enjoyed by the select 
few and out of reach to the masses, new prosperity is open to everyone”75; 
or “new power is power to the people”.76 Whilst these principles refer to 
the potential of software, taken out of context it would be hard to 
distinguish between the arguments of political and technological 
populism. It is also apparent that blockchain manifestos are not as much 
technological or programmatic documents, but empty promises and 
communication strategies meant to attract supporters and create 
polarization. Populist rhetoric is employed to keep up the ‘hype’.  
The populist discourse is found in all manifestos of blockchain 
aficionados, but citing them all would go beyond the purposes of our 
paper. What we would still wish to address in regard to connections 
between blockchain and populism, is the potential for (mis)appropriation 
by the members of the challenged elite, just like Trump managed to do in 
the US elections. This potential did not go unnoticed by populists 
themselves. Steve Bannon, the man who many credit for the success of 
Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign and now seems to be coordinating 
European populist movements, asserted that ‘Bitcoin and other 
cryptocurrencies can disrupt banking the way Trump disrupted American 
politics.’77 He wanted to create a blockchain-based token for the 
worldwide populist movement, known as ‘the Deplorables,’ driving its 
name from the famous ‘Basket of Deplorables’ category in which Hillary 
Clinton put half of Trump supporters.78 Its aim was to take control of 
money and finance as a tool to control political constituency.   
So far, our narrative demonstrated that the very foundation of the 
blockchain is framed and communicated using populist discourse and 
                                                          
73 Principle 3: Blockchain is distributed power. 
74 Principle 4: Blockchain is New Value. 
75 Principle 8: Blockchain is Prosperity – But Not as We Know It. 
76 Principle 10: Blockchain is New Power. 
77 Jeremy W. Peters and Nathaniel Popper ‘Stephen Bannon Buys into Bitcoin’ New York 
Times (June 14, 2018), retrieved from < 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/14/technology/steve-bannon-bitcoin.html> 
accessed 7 April 2019. 
78 Anthony Cuthbertson ‘Steve Bannon is Betting on Bitcoin and May Release his own 
‘Deplorables” Cryptocurrency’ Independent (June 15, 2018), retrieved from < 
https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/steve-bannon-
bitcoin-deplorables-coin-cryptocurrency-a8400051.html> accessed 7 April 2019. 
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strategy. The following section elaborates on the populist concepts as 
reflected by blockchain technology. 
3. THE POPULIST PROMISES OF BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY 
 We have briefly explained political populism and highlighted its 
close conceptual association with blockchain. In this section, we focus on 
two facets of blockchain technology manifestos that capture the populist 
rhetoric in the political sphere, namely disruption and the people vs. the 
elite rhetoric.  
3.1. DISRUPTION - CHALLENGING THE ESTABLISHMENT 
One of the founding aims of the Bitcoin, the first cryptocurrency, 
was to disrupt the existing financial system, including the creation and 
control of money. Nakamoto’s Manifesto employed a neutral language 
and perhaps conveyed an economic efficiency rationale in advocating for 
‘purely peer-to-peer (P2P) version of electronic cash that allows online 
payments to be sent directly from one party to another without going 
through a financial institution.’79 
While cutting out middlemen in conducting transactions cuts costs 
and increases speed, the P2P cash system has an implication that goes 
beyond efficiency. It has effect not only on simple payments but on the 
creation and control of money supply. It takes away the exclusive power 
of creating money from Central Banks and states. According to Charles 
David George “[…] BitCoin looks like it was designed as a weapon 
intended to damage central banking and money issuing banks, with a 
Libertarian political agenda in mind—to damage states’ ability to collect 
tax and monitor their citizens’ financial transactions."80  
The disruptive effect of Bitcoin removes not only intermediaries in 
economic transactions but also aims to reject legitimate government 
                                                          
79 Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System (November 1, 
2008). The original paper is retrieved from <https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf> accessed 
23 February 2019. 
80 Charles Davide George ‘Charlie Stross,” Why I want Bitcoin to Die in a Fire’ 
(December 18, 2014), retrieved from <http://www.antipope.org/charlie/blog-
static/2013/12/why-i-want-bitcoin-to-die-in-a.html> accessed 7 April 2019. 
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regulation.81 Bitcoin is a tool for criminal enterprises such as laundering 
money, tax evasion, or other shady transactions.82   
The blockchain technology is the most important innovation 
emerging from bitcoin, supposedly having unlimited application across 
sectors. The promise of recapturing power from financial elites and 
handing it back to the disenfranchised individual provides a universal 
legitimacy for blockchain, just as it legitimizes support for populist leaders. 
It aspires to disrupt the existing system of finance, data governance, 
corporate governance and other important aspects of modern economy. 
Nevertheless, the disruptive goal of blockchain has failed in many regards, 
as illustrated by the following two examples.  
The first example pertains to blockchain and finance, where the 
technology was set to fundamentally disrupt banking and reduce the 
profitability of banks.83From the very outset, it was clear that a P2P system 
of payment with no central clearing system would not function. That is 
because payment processing84—approval and clearing—is expected to be 
conducted by individuals in the network, incentivized by rewards they 
obtain for their computational skill and resource, with no central office in 
charge of rectifying delays or irregularities in payment.85 The Bank of 
International Settlement (BIS) pointed out this unsuitability of 
cryptocurrencies in its 2018 annual report. BIS stated that 
“Cryptocurrencies cannot scale with transaction demand, are prone to 
congestion and greatly fluctuate in value. Overall, the decentralised 
technology of cryptocurrencies, however sophisticated, is a poor 
                                                          
81 Andreas M. Antonopoulos, Mastering Bitcoin, programming the open blockchain (1491954388, 
Second edition edn, O'Reilly 2017), p. 3. 
82 Sean Foley, Jonathan R Karlsen and Tālis J Putniņš, ‘Sex, Drugs, and Bitcoin: How 
Much Illegal Activity Is Financed through Cryptocurrencies?’ 32 The Review of Financial 
Studies 1798, p. 1798. 
83 Antonopoulos stated ‘As with the many industries disintermediated by the Internet, 
banks will survive. But they will be fundamentally changed and their power and 
profitability will be significantly reduced. They can’t adapt and they can’t stop this 
disruption.’ Daniel Araya, ‘The Promise of Bitcoin: An Interview with Andreas M. 
Antonopoulos’ Futurism (February 29, 2016), retrieved from 
<https://futurism.com/promise-bitcoin-interview-andreas-m-antonopoulos> accessed 
25 April 2019.  
84 Joan Antonio Donet, Cristina Perez-Sola, and Jordi Herrera-Joancomart, The Bitcoin 
P2P Network (March 7, 2014). 
85 Asress Gikay, Regulating Decentralized Cryptocurrencies Under Payment Services 
Law: Lessons from European Union Law, Case Western Reserve Journal of Law, 
Technology & the Internet,Vol. 9, 2018, vol 9 (2018), pp. 25-26. 
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substitute for the solid institutional backing of money.”86  BIS’s position 
is a severe blow to those who advanced the narrative that Bitcoin would 
disrupt the financial system.  
 Second, blockchain has not delivered a concrete result in its other 
industry applications. In 2018, a group of researchers studied forty-three 
highly praised blockchain use cases and concluded that they found no 
evidence of an actual result.87  One area in which blockchain is supposed 
to thrive is replacing traditional contract negotiation through a smart 
contract— “programmable computer protocols that are able to self-
enforce the terms therein encoded upon certain triggering conditions.”88 
Yet, blockchain-based smart contracts have been proven to be 
impracticable.  
On the one hand, creating a computer program that self-executes 
complex contractual relationships involving various legal terms, 
conditions, and limitations and other human elements, such as good faith 
and trust, is decidedly impossible.89  On the other hand, many of the 
blockchain based smart contracts utilized for corporate governance 
showed deviations in the publicly stated promises and the actual terms 
coded in the smart contract.90 Based on the study of the top fifty Initial 
Coin Offerings in 2017, Sklaroff et al found a significant discrepancy 
between publicly available white papers or other contract types and the 
actual smart contracts, where founders maintained undisclosed codes and 
sometimes unilaterally modified entity governance structure.91 These 
                                                          
86 BIS, Annual Economic Report (June 2018), 91, retrieved from 
<https://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2018e.pdf > accessed 8 April 2019. 
87 Aaron Hankin, ‘Blockchain companies go silent when their tech promises fall short, 
research group finds’ Market Watch (Dec 4, 2018), retrieved from 
<https://www.marketwatch.com/story/blockchain-companies-go-silent-when-their-
tech-promises-fall-short-research-group-finds-2018-12-04> accessed April 25, 2019.    
88 Cuccuru, p 1. 
89  Sklaroff argues that smart contracts, in attempting to replace flexibility in human 
negotiation increases transactions costs. He states ‘’ these tradeoffs suggest that 
technology cannot replace what is fundamentally a human activity. Smart contracting 
certainly proposes exciting new changes to the way transactions might take place and 
presents a meaningful step forward from the days of EDI. But a full-scale smart 
contracting revolution would introduce costs far more extreme and intractable than the 
ones it seeks to solve. Proponents who argue for a complete replacement of semantic 
contracts underestimate the power of fluid human behavior and judgment in the 
contracting process. The flexibility of semantic contracts is a feature, not a bug.  Jeremy 
Sklaroff, ‘Smart Contracts and the Cost of Inflexibility’ (Philadelphia) 166 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 263, p. 303. 
90 Shaanan Cohney and others, ‘Coin-Operated Capitalism’ 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3215345> , pp. 20-27. 
91 Ibid 86. 
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stories suggest that the smart contracts, although inflexible and computer 
programmable, far from distributing decision making power and 
empowering the individual,  give leeway to technocrats to maintain 
asymmetrical power relationship visa-a-vis the crowd.  
  The technology’s inability to deliver on promises of disruption in 
finance, corporate governance, and contract execution did not stop the 
advocates from pushing the hype. Thus, the promises of blockchain 
technology can easily be compared with Trump’s promise to build a wall 
and make Mexico pay for it. Although patently unrealistic, such promise 
was taken seriously by his base. The rhetoric of the wall is still being 
pushed by the US president, with a changed narrative, suggesting that 
Mexico will pay in a form of tariff, rather than directly.  
3.2. EMPOWERING THE DISENFRANCHISED AGAINST THE ELITES 
As shown, populism creates a divide between ‘the people’ and ‘the 
elites’ accused of having hijacked power from the people and running the 
system to their own benefit.92 After his presidential election, Trump 
declared that: “the forgotten men and women of our country will be 
forgotten no longer.”93 The message could not be clearer. The political 
elites no longer represent everyday citizens. Rather, they collude with 
corporations and financial institutions fighting for their common interest. 
Blockchain technology was built on similar rhetoric and now struggles to 
distance itself from its own history by changing the narrative as the 
technology evolves. 
  In the proceeding sub-sections, we examine how the three 
features of cryptocurrencies and potentially other blockchain-based 
currencies or assets claim to empower the disenfranchised. These features 
are decentralization, trust in computation, and anonymity. Ultimately, 
none of these empowers the people. On the contrary, they are used to 
accumulate wealth for a small group of people through hyperbolic 
marketing, manipulation and deception tactics. 
                                                          
92 William Galston, ‘The Populist Challenge to Liberal Democracy’ (Baltimore) 29 
Journal of Democracy 5, p. 11.  ‘These observers argue that elites, by taking important 
issues such as economic, monetary, and regulatory policies off the public agenda and 
assigning them to institutions insulated from public scrutiny and influence, have invited 
precisely the popular revolt that now threatens to overwhelm them.’ 
93 David Jackson, and Doug Stanglin, ‘‘Trump is now president: 'The forgotten ... will be 
forgotten no longer'’, USA Today (Jan 20, 2017), retrieved from 
<https://eu.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/01/20/donald-trump-
inauguration-day-president-white-house/96782700/> accessed 9 April, 2019.   
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3.2.1. THE ILLUSION OF DECENTRALIZATION 
As shown, one of the philosophies of cryptocurrencies 
(permissionless blockchain) is the lack of central authority that controls 
them, meaning an authority that issues them and controls the 
technological infrastructure in which they function. Permissionless 
Blockchain is available to anyone who is willing and able to engage in a 
transaction verification process.94 The imagined virtue of decentralization 
is cutting out middlemen in transaction processing, primarily payment 
systems; but the principle is equally applicable to blockchain based systems 
including data transfer, corporate governance, and other transactions.  
Antonopoulos stated “Bitcoin’s decentralized security model puts a 
lot of power in the hands of the users. With that power comes 
responsibility for maintaining the secrecy of the keys.”95  Although 
Antonopoulos is referring to the security of Bitcoin network, he does 
imply that the decentralization of Bitcoin puts the user in charge as 
opposed to traditional banking or payment system where a central 
authority is in charge. Echoing this sentiment, Bitcoin’s early investor and 
entrepreneur Charlie Shrem wrote “for me, this is the most important 
aspect of Bitcoin and cryptocurrency: its role in propagating power to the 
greatest number of people possible. What Satoshi did when he 
democratized money was hand every individual alive – and generations to 
come – vast personal liberty.”96 Whether the above is true or not is not for 
this paper to determine. What is clear is that Nakamoto sold something 
for an estimated value of $19 Billion.97 And what he sold was neither 
personal liberty nor money. But let us return to the fundamental questions. 
Is decentralization real, feasible, and desirable? 
3.2.1.1 Decentralization is not real 
Early critique quickly pointed out that, although decentralized in 
principle, a closer look at the governance structure shows that Bitcoin is 
not truly decentralized. De Filippi and Loveluck argue: 
                                                          
94 Antonopoulos, p. 177.  
95 Ibid 232. 
96 Charlie Shrem, ‘Bitcoin’s White Paper Gave Us Liberty – Let’s Not Give It Back’ 
(Coindesk, October 20, 2018), retrieved from <https://www.coindesk.com/bitcoins-
white-paper-gave-us-liberty-lets-not-give-it-back> accessed 9 April 2019.  
97 Satoshi Nakamoto’s estimated earnings from cryptocurrencies as of 2018 is $19 Billion 
making him/her the number one profiteer of the technology.  Cherry Reynard, ‘Who are 
the richest cryptocurrency investors?’ The Telegraph (25 May 2018), retrieved from 
<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/digital-money/richest-crypto-investors/> 
accessed 25 April 2019. 
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‘[…] Hence, just like many other open source projects, there is a 
discrepancy between those who can provide input to the project (the 
community at large) and those who have the ultimate call as to where the 
project is going. Indeed, while anyone is entitled to submit changes to the 
software (such as bug fixes, incremental improvements, etc.), only a small 
number of individuals (the core developers) have the power to decide which 
changes shall be incorporated into the main branch of the software.’98  
In the governance structure of Bitcoin, decentralization shrinks at 
the top level with implication not only on the democratic decision-making 
process but also on the technical functioning of the system. One example 
illustrates the problem. In the design of the Bitcoin blockchain, every 
block had a capacity of 1 megabyte.99 The block size limit was placed 
allegedly to ensure that the blockchain remains decentralized, since high 
block size means that there would be delays in transaction propagation as 
large miners could benefit at the expense of small miners, hence creating 
centralization.100  
Some of the core developers of Bitcoin wanted to increase the block 
size on the ground that it has been arbitrarily fixed and it is causing a delay 
in transaction confirmation.101 It was claimed that transactions remained 
unexecuted between 60 seconds to 14 hours as a direct consequence of 
the limit in block size.102 We note here that lately transaction delays are in 
terms of days and weeks. Due to disagreement among the core developers 
on whether to increase the block size, Mike Hearn, one of the core 
developers resigned as a full-time Bitcoin developer in January 2016.103  
Due to the sustained disagreement among the developers and 
miners, as of August 1, 2017, a split or what is referred to in a technical 
term as “a hard fork” has occurred, leading to two different chains in the 
                                                          
98 Filippi Primavera De and Loveluck Benjamin, ‘The invisible politics of Bitcoin: 
governance crisis of a decentralised infrastructure’ 5 Internet Policy Review, p.13. 
99 Blockchain, Average Block Size (2017), retrieved from 
<https://blockchain.info/charts/avg-block-size> accessed 24 July 2017. See also ibid  7.  
100 Retrieved from  
<https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/5p9iv8/arguments_against_increasin
g_the_block_size/> accessed 24 July 2017. 
101 Mike Hearn, The resolution of the Bitcoin experiment (2016), retrieved from 
<https://medium.com/@jgarzik/bitcoin-is-being-hot-wired-for-settlement-
a5beb1df223a>, accessed 24 July 2017.  
102 Retrieved from  <https://forums.prohashing.com/viewtopic.php?f=11&t=679>, 
accessed 4 April 2017. 
103 Retrieved from <http://www.newsbtc.com/2016/01/15/mike-hearn-resigns-and-
leaves-bitcoin-permanently/>, accessed 4 April 2017.  
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blockchain.104 With the hard fork, two separate systems have been created.  
In one chain, due to a software upgrade, the block size increased from 1 
megabyte to 2. In the other, the block size to 8 megabytes.105 The latter 
option led to the creation of a new cryptocurrency – Bitcoin Cash 
(BCC).106  Both bitcoin and bitcoin cash co-exist ever since then, each 
having its backers and different market values.107  
The story highlights how millions of citizens who believed in the 
promise of decentralization are forced to accept a decision made by a 
technical elite who claimed that it will take power back from the state, 
central banks, and traditional financial institutions and give to the people. 
Weather in part or in full, decentralization is not real. 
3.2.1.2 Decentralization is not feasible 
Further, in 2018, a group of companies that engage in Bitcoin mining 
combined their hashing power and colluded to compel a software upgrade 
which resulted in the creation of new cryptocurrency based on bitcoin 
blockchain against the rule that decision has to be made by the majority 
of the network’s members.108  They were the majority. Only that they 
rigged the system to create the majority and diluted the power of the 
individual. 
The scandal led to a lawsuit in the District Court of Southern District 
of Florida, where the plaintiff claimed, among others, compensation for 
various damages caused by a global meltdown of the value of bitcoin.109 
                                                          
104 Bitcoin Cash: 5 Fast Facts you need to Know, retrieved from 
<http://heavy.com/news/2017/08/how-does-bitcoin-cash-work/>, accessed 2 August 
2017. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Ibid. “On the 1st   of August 2017, several hours after the fork had been completed, 
Coin Market Cap reported that Bitcoin Cash (BCH) which is the newly created by using 
the 8 megabytes block is priced around $379.40, a fraction of the original Bitcoin’s value, 
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108 United American Corp. vs Bitmain, Inc.,  US District Court of Southern District of 
Florida, Complaint, para 70-80, retrieved from 
<https://www.scribd.com/document/395100102/2018-12-06-1-
Complaint#from_embed?campaign=SkimbitLtd&ad_group=100652X1574425Xa95dc
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=affiliate> accessed 9 April 2019.   
109 United American Corp. vs Bitmain, Inc., US District Court of Southern District of 
Florida, Complaint, retrieved from 
<https://www.scribd.com/document/395100102/2018-12-06-1-
Complaint#from_embed?campaign=SkimbitLtd&ad_group=100652X1574425Xa95dc
b5495e61f31dc1885674d6d1cdf&keyword=660149026&source=hp_affiliate&medium
=affiliate> accessed 9 April 2019.   
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The problem known as the ‘51 % attack’ occurs when a decision has to be 
made based on consensus, but an entity or a group of entities controlling 
51% of the hashing/computing power override the decision, prevent it or 
even reverse transactions that were already confirmed.110 The case 
demonstrates that the Bitcoin protocol is not decentralized and is 
susceptible to be controlled by a single entity.  
Whatever core changes take place within the bitcoin protocol 
depends on whether the core developers—a select few— agree on it.111 
The core developers are not a group of people elected democratically. 
They were chosen based on their expertise, their involvement in the 
project and their shared ideology with the founder.112 In other words, they 
are the elite of both the technically and financially empowered elites. The 
small miners down the ladder are insignificant as far as significant changes 
are concerned. Thus, it is impossible to make a claim that a system that is 
built by the elite, for the elite empowers citizens around the world. 
3.2.1.3 Decentralization is not desirable  
Antonopoulos argues that Bitcoin’s complete decentralization 
ensures robustness, prevents criminals from breaching the system, and 
makes the network government intervention-proof.113 Even if this 
assertion was true, the question from both consumers’ and regulators’ 
perspective becomes whether total decentralization is desirable and to 
what end. We will use the European Union’s payment services law as an 
example. Although there are slight variations in national laws, the 
regulation of payment services has the same fundamentals in many 
countries. 
                                                          
110 Antonopoulos, p. 211. ‘One attack scenario against the consensus mechanism is called 
the “51% attack.” In this scenario a group of miners, controlling a majority (51%) of the 
total network’s hashing power, collude to attack bitcoin. With the ability to mine the 
majority of the blocks, the attacking miners can cause deliberate “forks” in the blockchain 
and double-spend transactions or execute denial-of-service attacks against specific 
transactions or addresses. A fork/double-spend attack is one where the attacker causes 
previously confirmed blocks to be invalidated by forking below them and re-converging 
on an alternate chain. With sufficient power, an attacker can invalidate six or more blocks 
in a row, causing transactions that were considered immutable (six confirmations) to be 
invalidated.’ 
111 Today, the top-level administrators of Bitcoin called, maintainers are three in number. 
See Bitcore, retrieved from <https://bitcoincore.org/en/team/ > accessed 09 April 
2019.  
112 Primavera De and Benjamin. 
113 Antonopoulos, p. 3. 
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First, the legal regime governing payment Services in the EU—the 
Payment Services Directive (PSD II) 114— does not accommodate 
permissionless blockchain-based payment system. Under the PSD II, to 
get an authorization to engage in payment service provision, a payment 
service institution must have prudent management, robust governance 
arrangement, clear organizational structure, and well-defined, transparent, 
and consistent lines of responsibility.115 Cryptocurrencies based on 
permissionless blockchain inherently reject a centrally managed 
organization because the transfer of funds can be performed directly 
between the sender and the receiver, with no central processing 
authority.116 In this system, individuals with no legal obligation to clear 
transactions engage in transaction validation. Hence,117 those who are 
unable to complete a transaction due to the inaction of transaction 
validators have no central office to seek remedy from.  
In payment services provided by traditional currencies, the payment 
service provider is liable for any charges and interest resulting from the 
non-execution, defective, or late execution of the payment transaction.118 
For transactions ‘on the blockchain’, no similar rule could be designed 
because there is no central office in charge of executing payments. Since 
the transaction validator could be anyone in the world, there is no way for 
a legislature or supervisory authority to design workable redress and 
penalty systems.119 
 Although cryptocurrency exchange platforms have created 
centralization, they are effective only in executing 'off-chain' transactions, 
meaning the transactions conducted without updating the public ledger on 
which the cryptocurrency is based.120  To benefit from central payment 
processing, users must go through exchange platforms to conduct their 
                                                          
114 Directive 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 
2015 on Payment Services in the Internal Market, Amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 
2009/110/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, and Repealing 
Directive 2007/64/EC, OJEU L 337/35 (PSD II). 
115 Id at Art. 11(4).  
116 Id at Art. 11(4). 
117 Joan Antoni Donet Donet, Cristina Perez-Sola, and Jordi Herrera-Joancomart, The 
Bitcoin P2P Network in Rainer Böhme and others, Financial cryptography and data security, 
FC 2014 Workshops, BITCOIN and WAHC 2014, Christ Church, Barbados, March 7, 2014, 
revised selected papers (3662447746, Springer 2014), p. 87.    
118 PSD II (n 87) Art. 89(3). 
119 For rules on complaint and penalty mechanisms under PSD II, see ibid Arts 90 and 
103 respectively. 
120 Hughes Sarah Jane and T. Middlebrook Stephen, ‘Advancing a Framework for 
Regulating Cryptocurrency Payments Intermediaries’ 32 Yale Journal on Regulation 495, 
p. 559 
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transactions.121 In any event, final settlement of any cryptocurrency 
transaction must be registered on the relevant blockchain,122 which means 
that exchange platforms themselves ultimately encounter the potential 
delay or irregularity in settling their payment on the blockchain.  It is for 
this reason that the BIS finally gave its verdict that ”[c]ryptocurrencies 
cannot scale with transaction demand […] Overall, the decentralised 
technology of cryptocurrencies, however sophisticated, is a poor 
substitute for the solid institutional backing of money.”123   
Notwithstanding all the above, one could ask about decentralization 
in other aspects of the economy. Ten years after blockchain started being 
implemented, there is no evidence that its decentralisation has other 
concretely proven industrial applications. The idea of distributed storage 
of data or asset management with no central authority is simply a talking 
point. Nouriel puts it as follows: 
‘As for blockchain itself, there is no institution under the sun – 
bank, corporation, non-governmental organisation or government agency 
– that would put its balance sheet or register of transactions, trades and 
interactions with clients and suppliers on public decentralised peer-to-peer 
permissionless ledgers. There is no good reason why such proprietary and 
highly valuable information should be recorded publicly. Moreover, in 
cases where distributed-ledger technologies – so-called enterprise DLT – 
are actually being used, they have nothing to do with blockchain. They 
are private, centralised and recorded on just a few controlled ledgers. They 
require permission for access, which is granted to qualified individuals. 
And, perhaps most important, they are based on trusted authorities that 
have established their credibility over time. All of which is to say, these 
are “blockchains” in name only.’ 
If blockchain technology would have had a ground-breaking 
industrial application, we would have heard about it and many would have 
written about it. That is not the case. As we have shown, blockchain-based 
currencies cannot be purely decentralized. There would be a central point 
of control for the system to create responsibility, accountability, and 
efficiency.  
Decentralizing everything from payments to storing data, tracking 
goods and services, and empowering everyone by excluding intermediaries 
                                                          
121 Edward V. Murphy et al, ‘Bitcoin: Questions, Answers, and Analysis of Legal Issues’ 
(2015) US Congressional Research Report 7-5700, 5. 
122 David Lee Kuo, p. 49. 
123 BIS, Annual Economic Report (June 2018), 91, retrieved from 
<https://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2018e.pdf > accessed 8 April 2019. 
NJCL 2019/2 90 
 
is an appealing promise. However, our research reveals it to be largely a 
utopia, with no or little basis in reality. 
3.2.2. TRUST IN COMPUTATION — GETTING UNMERITED TRUST 
Political science establishes a close relationship between populism 
and lack of trust in mainstream political parties and government 
institutions.124 Lack of trust was exacerbated during and after the financial 
crisis, when citizens lost faith not only in financial institutions but also in 
the political actors who chose to bail out these institutions, to the 
detriment and at the expense of the citizens. Restoring public trust in 
financial institutions became the beacon of all legislative acts that 
followed. For instance, in the preamble of the Mortgage Directive,125 the 
European Parliament, and the Council of the EU stated that the financial 
crisis has led to ”a lack of confidence among all parties, in particular 
consumers”.126 Restoring and strengthening their confidence was, thus, a 
concern for all European institutions.127 
While states were engaging in implementing measures aimed at 
restoring trust in the market and financial institutions, technology geeks 
were crafting a strategy to capitalize on the crisis. The emergence of 
Bitcoin during the period of diminishing confidence in the existing 
financial institutions in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis128 
is not a coincidence. The crisis has certainly helped marketing the 
technology. Varoufakis alluded to this stating: 
‘The Crash of 2008 has infused our societies with enormous 
skepticism on the role of the authorities, both government and Central 
Banks. It is quite natural that many dream of a currency that politicians, 
bankers, and central bankers cannot manipulate; a currency of the people 
by the people for the people. Bitcoin has emerged as the great white hope 
of something of the sort.’129 
                                                          
124 Catherine Fieschi and Paul Heywood, ‘Trust, cynicism and populist anti‐politics’ 
[Taylor and Francis Ltd] 9 Journal of Political Ideologies 289, pp. 289-309. 
125 Directive 2014/17/EU on credit agreements for consumers relating to residential 
immovable property, retrieved from: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0017&from=EN>, access on 22 April 
2019. 
126 Recital 3, Mortgage Directive. 
127 Restoring, strengthening, or ensuring confidence is mentioned several times in the 
preamble to the Mortgage Directive: Recital 3, Recital 31, and Recital 35. 
128 M. Uslaner Eric, ‘Trust and the Economic Crisis of 2008’ 13 Corporate Reputation 
Review 110, pp. 210-223. 
129 Yanis Varoufakis, Bitcoin and the dangerous fantasy of ‘apolitical’ money, Yanis 
Varoufakis Blog (Apr. 22, 2013), retrieved from 
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Thus, one of the alleged attributes of cryptocurrencies is that they 
do not require trust in any central authority, private or public. In traditional 
banking customers should trust third-party intermediaries, including 
banks and other third-party payment service providers,130 while in 
cryptocurrency systems, trust in third-party intermediaries is 
unnecessary.131  This is one of the sales pitches for cryptocurrencies and 
other blockchain-based transactions emulating the philosophy behind 
Bitcoin.   
Scholars acknowledge that “Bitcoin was born out of a distrust for 
authority and driven by a desire for governance by community consensus 
rather than central authority.”132 The question becomes, what is the 
underlying trust-related problem that computation aims to solve?  And, 
furthermore, is trust in a third-party truly limited by blockchain? 
Antonopoulos states: 
“Here’s the most important effect of this new trust model of trust-
by-computation: no one actor is trusted, and no one needs to be trusted. 
There is no central authority or trusted third party in a distributed 
consensus network. That fact opens up a completely new network model, 
as the network no longer needs to be closed, access-controlled, or encrypted. 
Trust does not depend on excluding bad actors, as they cannot ‘fake’ 
trust. They cannot pretend to be the trusted party, as there is none.”133 
The fundamental problem seems to be the inability of trusted 
financial institutions to protect customers from bad actors that get 
involved in double spending funds or outright theft through breaching 
                                                          
<https://www.yanisvaroufakis.eu/2013/04/22/bitcoin-and-the-dangerous-fantasy-of-
apolitical-money/> accessed 9 April 2019.  
130 Nakamoto states “Commerce on the Internet has come to rely almost exclusively on 
financial institutions serving as trusted third parties to process electronic payments. While 
the system works well enough for most transactions, it still suffers from the inherent 
weaknesses of the trust-based model.” 
131 Brian Kelly, The Bitcoin big bang : how alternative currencies are about to change the world 
(9781118963647 
9781118963654 
9781118963661, 2015), p. 69.  
132 Usha Rodrigues, ‘Law and the Blockchain’ (Iowa City) 104 Iowa Law Review 679, 
715. Kiviat describes it as ‘In short, the Blockchain is a “trustless” technology. “Trustless” 
means—for the first time in history—exchanges for value over a Computer network can 
be verified, monitored, and enforced without the presence of a trusted third party or 
central institution.’(Citations omitted). Trevor, p. 574. 
133Andrea Antonopoulos, Bitcoin security model: trust by computation A shift from 
trusting people to trusting math (2014), retrieved from 
<http://radar.oreilly.com/2014/02/bitcoin-security-model-trust-by-
computation.html>, accessed 24 July 2017.  
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cybersecurity or fraudulent behaviors.134 The distributed digital ledger 
makes it closer to impossible to engage in these kinds of behaviors. Is that 
true? The answer to this question should be given based on the overall 
infrastructure in which cryptocurrencies function and various tools that 
bad actors might exploit.  
The claim that trust is not needed at the heart of Bitcoin or other 
cryptocurrencies makes more sense to the technical experts than to 
average people. Evidence shows that even experts have lost their trust in 
the system, which is why they take each other to courts of law over a 
matter that should have been solved by computation.135  There are areas 
where trust is required within the Bitcoin ecosystem. One of them is the 
transaction verification, the very system where trust in a third-party is 
deemed irrelevant. Given that the cost for verification of transactions is 
covered by transaction fees and different users can offer different rates, 
certain transactions could remain unconfirmed in the blockchain. That is 
because miners could choose to dedicate their computational power to 
higher fee transactions.136 Users who offer lower transaction fees are, thus, 
uncertain that their transactions get confirmed in time. This requires trust 
in the integrity of the miners, who, in this case, act as third-parties, not to 
discriminate against low paying transactions.   
Furthermore, the argument that blockchain removes trusted third-
parties assumes that the blockchain is the only infrastructure necessary for 
the functioning of cryptocurrencies. In practice, cryptocurrencies cannot 
function without other supporting infrastructures, such as exchange 
platforms and digital wallets. Non-expert users of cryptocurrencies 
purchase cryptocurrencies from exchange platforms using traditional 
currencies and this renders the exchange platforms a necessary part of the 
cryptocurrency ecosystem. Only technical experts can earn 
                                                          
134 Ibid. See also Nakamoto who states that ‘Commerce on the Internet has come to rely 
almost exclusively on financial institutions serving as trusted third parties to process 
electronic payments. While the system works well enough for most transactions, it still 
suffers from the inherent weaknesses of the trust-based model. Completely non-
reversible transactions are not really possible, since financial institutions cannot avoid 
mediating disputes.’ 
135 United American Corp. vs Bitmain, Inc., US District Court of Southern District of 
Florida, Complaint, para 70-80, retrieved from 
<https://www.scribd.com/document/395100102/2018-12-06-1-
Complaint#from_embed?campaign=SkimbitLtd&ad_group=100652X1574425Xa95dc
b5495e61f31dc1885674d6d1cdf&keyword=660149026&source=hp_affiliate&medium
=affiliate> accessed 9 April 2019.   
136 Olusegun Ogundeji, ‘Bitcoin Transactions Confirmation Delays’ Cointelegraph, Oct, 
27, 2016 <https://cointelegraph.com/news/bitcoin-transactions-confirmation-delays> 
accessed 10 April 2019. 
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cryptocurrencies by mining.137 The non-expert users may need to store 
their cryptocurrencies in third-party administered digital wallets who 
should keep funds safely.  
Cryptocurrency exchange platforms and digital wallet providers are 
similar to traditional financial institutions. They are third-party 
intermediaries that operate on the same principle of trust. They are 
susceptible to the same challenges traditional financial institutions, 
including theft and cyber security breaches.138 In 2018, Bitgrail, an 
exchange platform, was declared bankrupt before an Italian court due to 
a security breach that cost its customers $70 Million.139 Generally, loss of 
funds due to a security breach affecting an exchange platform is covered 
by the exchange platform, but Bitgrail blamed the hacking on a defect in 
its software developed by a third-party developer, attributing the fault and 
liability to the software developer140 and dragging the consumer through 
lengthy litigation. Similarly, the Florida litigation on the manipulation of 
decision making by dominant entities within the Bitcoin network141 
illustrates that users have no reason to trust the system, even when it is in 
its purest form with no adulteration by external ecosystems.  
 In ‘Trust, But Verify: Why the Blockchain Needs the Law’, Werbach 
documents multiple trust-related problems in blockchain.142  He 
underlines that the smart contract itself suffers from errors, for instance, 
costing a Canadian Exchange Platform QuadrigaCX, over $ 14 Million.143 
                                                          
137 The process of creating bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies is known as mining- 
solving automatically generated mathematical puzzles towards processing transactions of 
users simultaneously. In more technical terms, “…mining is the competitive process of 
collecting transactions and adding them to the blockchain in the form of blocks.” C. 
Barski and C. Wilmer, Bitcoin for the Befuddled (No Starch Press, Incorporated 2014), pp. 4, 
26. 
138 See generally Mt. Gox Collapse of 214 resulting in loss of 850000.000 BTC due to 
hacking, BITCOIN TALK (Nov. 16, 2014), retrieved from 
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=57633; See Wolfie Zhao, $30 Million: Ether 
Reported Stolen Due to Parity Wallet Breach, COINDESK (July 19, 2017), 
https://www.coindesk.com/30-million-ether-reported-stolen-parity-wallet-breach/.   
139 C. Edward Kelso, ‘Bitgrail Bitcoin Assets Taken by Italian Government, Victims Still 
Fuming’, Bitcoin.com (16 June 2018), retrieved from 
<https://news.bitcoin.com/bitgrail-bitcoin-assets-taken-by-italian-government-victims-
still-fuming/ > accessed 3 July 2018.  
140 See Bitgrail Lasts News, retrieved from <https://bitgrail.com/news> accessed 3 July 
2018. 
141 United American Corp. vs Bitmain, Inc., (supra n 109). 
142 Kevin Werbach, ‘TRUST, BUT VERIFY: WHY THE BLOCKCHAIN NEEDS 
THE LAW’ (Berkeley) 33 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 487, pp. 490-552. 
143 Ibid. 
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The cause of the loss was permanent inaccessibility of Ethereum 
blockchain-based tokens due to error in the smart contract.144 In 2016 
Distributed Autonomous Organization (DAO), a crowdfunded artificially 
intelligent entity based on blockchain was able to receive millions of 
dollars in crowdfunding.145 DAO was supposed to operate based on smart 
contract and enable corporate governance with no directors and board 
members. Because the blockchain and smart contract did not distinguish 
between legitimate fund transfer and theft, in 2017, $70 Million worth 
Ether was stolen by a hacker.146 These incidents debunk the myth that 
distributed digital ledgers filter back actors with no need for a trusted 
central authority as a custodian. According to 2018 report, ‘each day $2.7 
million is stolen from exchanges.’147  
This evidence shows that not only unsophisticated consumers are 
prone to theft and cyber-attack. Even well-financed institutions dealing 
with blockchain are incapable of protecting themselves and the public. 
The defect is not only in the external infrastructures and support systems 
but also in the most cherished byproducts of bitcoin: blockchain and smart 
contracts. None can be trusted. None can replace trust-based institutions, 
where legal rules sanction breach of such trust. 
The postulate of trusting in computation is no different than a 
populist slogan that manufactures distrust in the establishment or points 
out the reasons for which the establishment should not be trusted, while 
not offering a shred of evidence as to why the alternative is different. We 
now know that when the people fall into the trap of misplacing the trust 
into lies and deceptions, the result is the accumulation of wealth by 
political, respectively, ‘technological’ populists.  
                                                          
144 Ibid. 
145 Giulio Prisco ‘The DAO Raises More Than $117 Million in World's Largest 
Crowdfunding to Date’ Bitcoin Magazine (May 16, 2016), retrieved from 
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146 Ibid. See also Samuel Falkon, ‘The Story of the DAO  — Its History and 
Consequences’ The Medium (24 December 2017), retrieved from 
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71e6a8a551ee>, accessed 26 April 2019.  ‘[O]n June 17, 2016, a hacker found a loophole 
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the attack, 3.6 million ETH were stolen, the equivalent of $70 million at the time. Once 
the hacker had done the damage he intended, he withdrew the attack.’  
147 Eric Larcheveque , ‘2018: A Record-Breaking Year for Crypto Exchange Hacks’, 
Coindesk (December 29, 2018), retrieved from <https://www.coindesk.com/2018-a-
record-breaking-year-for-crypto-exchange-hacks> accessed 25 April 2019. 
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3.2.3. ANONYMITY— ANARCHY WITH A DROP OF PRIVACY 
Cryptocurrencies provide anonymity.148  This aspect of 
cryptocurrencies is appealing to both privacy-wary individuals, who 
legitimately want to protect themselves, and to criminals who want to 
engage in shady transactions. In Bitcoin, although all transactions 
conducted by the user are publicly visible, it is the public key (a unique set 
of numbers and letters that represents them (Bitcoin address).149 More 
precisely, the blockchain provides ‘pseudonymity’ because the user’s 
identity is hidden behind a pseudonym.150 
The anonymity provided by blockchain can be reversed by various 
techniques that link the Bitcoin address to the identity of the person.151 
For instance, if the user purchases a digital currency from an exchange 
using a bank account, the exchange or wallet provider has the knowledge 
of the identity of the person. Techniques that are more complex can also 
be used to tackle anonymity.152  
However, de-anonymizing requires time, technological expertise, 
and money. Despite the possibility of de-anonymization, the cost involved 
makes it practically difficult, which is one of the reasons that attract the 
use of digital currencies. This is exemplified by the donation page of 
WikiLeaks: “Bitcoins cannot be easily tracked back to you and are safer 
and faster alternative to other donation methods. […] Similar to Bitcoin, 
Litecoin offers very fast and secure transactions worldwide, and there are 
many exchanges allowing you to trade for Litecoins.”153 The Wikileaks 
donation page reflects the typical mind-set of cryptocurrency users, i.e., 
cryptocurrencies provide anonymity.  
 In the era of mass surveillance, collection, processing, and misuse 
of personal data by governments and giant corporations, it might be 
necessary to ensure anonymity/pseudonymity.154 Thus, blockchain 
promoters have used the ability of the technology to provide a bit of 
                                                          
148 Hanna Halaburda and M. Miklos Sarvary, Beyond bitcoin, the economics of digital currencies 
(1137506423, Palgrave Macmillan 2016), p. 100.  
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150 Ibid. 
151 Ibid 209. 
152 Ibid Cp. 13.  
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privacy, while they encourage anarchy and potential lawlessness in the 
digital space. In a paper published in 2019, Foley et al, documented that 
“[…] approximately one-quarter of Bitcoin users are involved in illegal 
activity…, around $76 billion of illegal activity per year involves Bitcoin 
(46% of Bitcoin transactions), which is close to the scale of the US and 
European markets for illegal drugs.”155 
Anonymity is one of the promises of blockchain-based transactions 
that stands out, as terrorist organizations seem to be actively taking 
advantage of it.156 An intriguing question to ask is how regulators could 
watch without taking measures while a system that aspires to revolutionize 
finance openly preaches anonymity (anarchy). Moreover, why are ‘people’ 
supporting this technology that undermines their safety and disrupts the 
institutions on which their society is built? While the answers to these 
questions are certainly many, we suggest one of our own: ‘technological 
populism’. 
During the 2016 US presidential campaign, the then-candidate 
Trump speaking to his supporters stated: “I could shoot somebody in the 
middle of the 5th Avenue and I wouldn’t lose voters.”157 His statement 
echoed the power of his populist promises in blinding his voters to his 
obvious flaws. The blockchain support base is similarly blinded by false 
promises of blockchain technology. This is why there has not been a major 
backlash from society, proportionate to the level of anarchy that the 
technology has helped advance by eroding rule of law.  
3.3. SUMMING UP: THE FALSE PROMISES OF TECHNOLOGICAL 
POPULISM 
Cryptocurrencies and blockchain, be it in finance or other industries, 
have not delivered the game-changing efficiency and empowerment they 
advertised.  The technology is deeply rooted in ideas that political 
populists also communicate to their constituencies and it is marketed using 
populist rhetoric. Thus, disrupting the existing financial system and 
industry, giving back disenfranchised individuals control over money, data 
                                                          
155 Foley, Karlsen and Putniņš, 1798.  
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It’, Forbes, April 31, 2018, retrieved from 
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157  Steve Holland & Ginger Gibson, ‘Donald Trump: 'I could shoot somebody, and I 
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and other aspects of their lives are all used to rally support for the 
technology.  
The developers of blockchain promised to perform miracles through 
decentralization or DLT, eliminating intermediaries and the long-standing 
trust in them and replacing it by trust in computation and by protecting 
identities in conducting transactions.  In a desperate attempt to sell the 
idea and secure its wider adoption, they framed the foundation of the 
technology based on rhetorics of empowering the disenfranchised, ‘the 
people’ vs ‘elitist institutions’ and ‘us’ vs ‘them.’ The evidence 
demonstrates that the large part of the promise of the technology is 
nothing more than demagoguery backed by technology.  
The outcome is not just a faulty technology that is struggling to 
justify its existence, but billions of dollars transfer of wealth from ‘the 
people’ to the new ‘elites’. ‘Technological populists’ created the 
technology, created high electricity-consuming algorithms and machines 
to mine the assets based on it,158 manipulated prices,159 enabled criminals 
to engage in illegal activities. They were motivated by lucrative payments, 
collected money from the public through crowd-funding named ICOs, 
and managed to manipulate regulators into abstaining from timely 
regulation.  
4. EXPLAINING THE RISE OF TECHNOLOGICAL POPULISM 
In the last part of the article, we briefly examine why technological 
populism have risen to the level where they go without being checked by 
the society and regulators. By examining the role of various stakeholders 
in a democratic society in the rise of populist leaders and the 
corresponding role of stakeholders in regulation of blockchain, we argue 
that a combination of different extraneous factors contributed to the rise 
of this kind of populism. We identify as factors that contributed to the 
phenomenon: the failure of media and the intelligentsia in advancing 
honest policy debate, and regulatory oversight.  
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4.1. THE ROLE OF MEDIA AND INTELLECTUAL SYCOPHANTS 
The media and the intelligentsia have their own role in constructing 
the technology ‘hype’. In this regard, we observe a parallel between the 
way the media built representations of blockchain and theways in which 
they built candidate Trump or other populist leaders.  
4.1.1. THE MEDIA 
The media has been painting a pink picture of blockchain from the 
very outset. For instance, it advertised technological populism by stating 
that cryptocurrencies will bank the unbanked,160 i.e., those who have no 
access to a credit card or debit card and hence are excluded from the 
financial system.161  
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have no incentive to engage in a cash-based transaction to access an asset whose use is 
limited vastly to the digital space.  Certainly, the unbanked have neither the means, nor 
the incentive to engage in these kinds of transactions. Therefore, today for the most part, 
cryptocurrencies are acquired from, stored, and traded on exchange platforms that the 
unbanked do not have access to. See Katie Benner and Sheera Frenkel, ‘Drug Dealers 
Targeted in Sweep of Illicit Online Marketplaces’ The New York Times (Washington 
Dc., 26 June 2018), retrieved from 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/26/us/politics/drug-dealers-dark-web-
arrests.html> accessed 17 October 2018. 
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In December 2017, the Financial Times published an opinion titled 
‘Bitcoin, Blockchain and the Fight Against Poverty’ highlighting Hernardo De 
Sotos' initiative to use blockchain to register property rights.162 Even if 
blockchain enables property registration in a reliable manner, it is not clear 
how that benefits the poor. Blockchain technology is exceedingly technical 
and requires infrastructures such as reliable electricity,163 internet, and 
computers, things that the poor struggle with in the first place. There is 
no evidence so far that blockchain and cryptocurrencies would lift people 
out of poverty. After a decade long campaign, the efficiency of new 
technology should not be evaluated solely on potential, but on results.  
Various forms of populism have always found an echo in the media. 
The most telling example is the hundreds of hours of interview conducted 
with candidate Trump until it became apparent that he constituted serious 
a threat in the elections.164 Blockchain populism is no different.  
4.1.2.  THE INTELLIGENTSIA 
Our research identified two categories of intellectual minionism.. 
The first consists of those who participate in the ‘hype’ of the technology 
by all means possible, including intellectual dishonesty. The second 
involves turning a blind eye to the adverse effect of the technology on rule 
of law and consumer welfare while emphasizing the potential industrial 
application of the technology.  
4.1.2.1. Hype by All Means? 
Bitcoin enthusiasts have compared it to gold in a manner aimed at 
‘hyping’ users and investors.165 The comparison focused on the process of 
creation of Bitcoin- mining - a term that also describes gold extraction 
process166 and the competitive prices for the two.167  Often, the 
cryptocurrency-gold comparison is based on the notion that gold is 
                                                          
162 Gillian Tett, ‘Bitcoin, blockchain and the fight against poverty’ The Financial Times 
(22 December 2017), retrieved from <https://www.ft.com/content/60f838ea-e514-
11e7-8b99-0191e45377ec> accessed 29 June 2018. 
 163G.F. ‘Why bitcoin uses so much energy’ The Economist (July 9, 2018), retrieved from 
<https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2018/07/09/why-bitcoin-
uses-so-much-energy> accessed 18 October 2918.  
164 David Sillito, ‘Donald Trump: How the media created the president’, BBC (14 Nov. 
2016), retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-37952249> 
accessed 11 April 2016.   
165 Jocelyn Aspa, Is Bitcoin the New Gold?, INVESTING NEWS (Sep. 2017), retrieved from 
<https://investingnews.com/daily/tech-investing/fintech-investing/bitcoin-the-new-
gold/> accessed on 13 January 2018. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. 
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expensive just because people subjectively view it as more valuable relative 
to other metallic commodities that are perhaps as durable and functional. 
Hence, goes the argument, if the users view cryptocurrencies as valuable, 
there is no reason not to treat them like gold. Reflecting this sentiment, 
Prentis argues: 
‘The price of traditional commodities, like gold, silver, and 
agricultural products, vary in accordance with their demand and scarcity. 
When more people want a commodity that has a fixed supply, the price 
rises. Similarly, the price of Bitcoin fluctuates according to the same fixed 
supply model…. Bitcoins are considered rare because there is a fixed 
supply of them, leading users to be willing to pay increasing prices to 
control them. The value of a Bitcoin is ultimately driven by supply and 
demand—a coin is worth whatever someone is willing to pay for it.’168 
According to Prentis, it is appropriate to treat Bitcoin as 
commodity169, asserting that Bitcoin has inherent value in its ability to 
reduce transaction cost by enabling less costly two-party transactions than 
traditional three-party transactions.170 In hindsight, as indicated by BIS, 
Bitcoin does not scale with high volume transactions and is a poor 
substitute for money.  
While it is undeniable that users/speculators are willing to pay for 
Bitcoin as much as they are willing to pay for gold, it is farfetched to argue 
that Bitcoin has intrinsic value. In examining whether that is true, Godlove 
argues that “It has more characteristics in common with commodities than 
with currency, except for the most essential: It has no inherent value.”171  
If intrinsic value is a value of a commodity judged independently of its 
monetary use or value of a thing for its own sake172 the question becomes 
whether cryptocurrencies remain useful when stripped of their ability to 
transfer funds. 
Bitcoin has also been compared with subterranean property.173 In 
2014, the US District Court of Western District of Washington handled a 
                                                          
168 Mitchell Prentis, ‘Digital metal: regulating Bitcoin as a commodity’ [Case Western 
Reserve University School of Law] 66 Case Western Reserve Law Review 609, p. 628. 
169 Ibid 626. 
170 Ibid 629 (“This means that the inherent value of a bitcoin is found in the difference 
of transaction costs between an online three-party exchange, and a two-party exchange.”) 
171 Nicholas Godlove, ‘Regulatory overview of virtual currency’ [University of Oklahoma 
College of Law] 10 Oklahoma Journal of Law and Technology 67, p. 26. 
172 Michael J. Zimmerman, Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value, THE STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2015), retrieved from 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-intrinsic-extrinsic/. 
173 Casey Doherty, ‘Bitcoin and Bankruptcy’ (Alexandria) [American Bankruptcy 
Institute] 33 American Bankruptcy Institute Journal 38, pp. 28–33. 
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case in which it considered, inter alia, whether a contract to mine and 
deliver a certain amount of Bitcoins constitutes an executory contract174. 
Examining the case, Doherty wrote an article in which he stated that 
‘Bitcoin also shares similarities to “subterranean” commodities through its 
extraction process, as demonstrated by in re CLI Holdings.’175 Citing 
Doherty’s article,  Borroni, in addressing the legal framework for  Bitcoin 
in the EU, wrote ‘…the qualification of Bitcoins as a commodity stems 
from the case  in re CLI Holdings, whereby the court treated Bitcoins like 
a “subterranean commodity” (for example oil), due to the similarities 
arising from the “extraction process” shared by both of them.’176  
Doherty’s article and, by extension, Borroni’s, make a factually incorrect 
suggestion that the court drew a parallel between Bitcoin and subterranean 
properties.  
In re CLI Holdings177 on or about 14th of August 2013, Bitvestment 
entered into a Bitcoin services agreement with CoinLab, CLI Holdings 
Inc. and their respective affiliates (Amended Agreement).178 As per the 
agreement, Bitvesment paid the debtor, 75, 000 USD in return for which 
the debtor agreed to mine and deliver 7,984.006735 BTC to 
Bitsvestment179. The debtor breached the contract failing to deliver the 
Bitcoins mined after the amended agreement, after which Bitvestment 
filed a lawsuit in the US District Court for the Southern District of NY 
against the Debtor seeking, inter alia, specific performance180.  
On November 5, 2013, the District Court stayed the action against 
the debtor because the debtor filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy,181  
subsequently to which it filed a motion to reject the contract.182 The 
debtor’s motion for rejection of the contract was based on U.S.C. § 365, 
which allows the judge to approve the rejection of the executory contract 
by the trustee183. The court dismissed the motion.  
                                                          
174 In re CLI Holdings, Case No. 13–19,746 (W.D. Wash. 2013). 
175 Doherty, pp. 28–33. 
176 Andrea Borroni, A Fuzzy Set in the Legal Domain: Bitcoins According to US Legal 
Formants, in Gabriella Gimigliano, Bitcoin and mobile payments : constructing a European Union 
framework (Palgrave Macmillan 2016). 
177 In Re CLI Holdings Inc., Washington Western Bankruptcy Court, Case No. 13-19746-
KAO (Feb. 7, 2014), Motion to Dismiss Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, p. 2. 
178 Ibid. 
179 Ibid. 
180 Ibid. 
181 Ibid.  
182 In Re CLI Holdings Inc., Washington Western Bankruptcy Court, Case No. 13-19746-
KAO (15 November 2013). 
183  11 U.S.C. §365(a). 
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In its reasoning, the court reaffirmed that the key feature of 
executory contracts is that the “obligations of both parties are so far 
unperformed that the failure of either party to complete performance 
would constitute a material breach and thus excuse the performance of 
the other.”184 It ruled that since Bitvestment has performed its obligation 
(paying 75, 000 USD), the debtor is the only party to the agreement with 
an ongoing obligation, namely to mine and deliver to Bitvestment the 
Bitcoins for which reason the contract was not executory185.  
Whether Bitcoin is a commodity or not was irrelevant in the case. In 
spite of this, Doherty compared Bitcoin with subterranean property.186 He 
stated that “the court, in keeping with the analogous majority view of oil 
and gas precedent (although not citing it), found that the debtor could not 
reject a contract where the only performance of the interest-holder was to 
receive production.”187 The court did not cite oil and gas precedents (by 
Doherty’s own admission), but he still used the case to draw a parallel 
between Bitcoin and subterranean properties. We cannot ignore the fact 
that commodities such as oil have physical existence and intrinsic value, 
whereas cryptocurrencies do not.  
To argue that cryptocurrencies are commodities and not money by 
using a judicial decision makes the claim more convincing. Nevertheless, 
it is neither intellectually insightful nor honest, to misuse judicial decisions 
only to ‘hype’ the technology and advance the agenda of technological 
populists.  
4.1.2.2. A 21st Century Dilemma: To Regulate or Not to Regulate?  
Some scholars held the view that despite the technological origin of 
transactions based on blockchain, for the most part, the existing legal 
regulations are capable of being enforced against them, if enforcement 
                                                          
184 In Re CLI Holdings Inc., Washington Western Bankruptcy Court, Case No. 13-19746- 
KA (12 Dec. 2013) , Order Denying Debtor's Motion to Reject Executory Contract with 
Bitvestment Partners LLC, p. 1. Since the court’s order cites the parties’ submissions, the 
reasoning of the court is found in the Creditor (Bitvestments’s) objection to debtor’s 
motion to reject executory contract. See In Re CLI Holdings Inc., Washington Western 
Bankruptcy Court, Case No. 13-19746-KAO (29 Nov. 2013), Bitvestment Partners 
LLC’s objection to debtor’s motion to reject executory contract, p. 4. The court relied on 
the definition of executory contracts provided by the Ninth Circuit in Marcus & Millichap 
Inc. v Munple, Ltd. (In re Munple), 868 F.2d 1129, 1130 (9th Cir.1989), cited by 
Bitvestment in its objection to the debtor’s motion for the rejection of the contract. 
185 Id. 
186 Supra note 174. 
187 Id. 
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authorities issued the appropriate guidelines.188 These categories of 
scholars generally call for ‘technology neutral’ or ‘functional interpretation’ 
of the legal rules. But, the intelligentsia that stands behind the technology 
is quick to suggest that because the technology is at its nascent stage, 
regulators should cuddle it,189 even if ten years have passed since it was 
introduced and a select few have made fortunes out of it.   
For instance, Michèle Finck alluded to, inter alia, a regulatory sandbox 
that should allow startup companies to experiment their innovation 
without complying with existing regulatory regimes.190 In a paper 
published in 2018, she claims to provide regulatory techniques. Instead 
she provides a cursory overview of blockchain use cases and an outline of 
possible regulatory approaches gathered from existing practices, described 
positively with no insightful normative regulatory theory. In order to 
advance her narrative, she praises the technology by mentioning how it 
helped poor people in Africa: “In Africa, blockchain has brought banking 
services to the unbanked, most famously through BitPesa, which provides 
blockchain-based mobile banking. Companies such as BitPesa and 
BitSpark moreover allow for the fast and cheap transfer of remittances.”191 
In support of her assertion, she cites the website of Bitpesa, the 
company that alleges to make money transfer in Africa cheaper. However, 
the information provided by Bitpesa should not be taken at face value. 
Bitpesa cannot transfer money to a customer that does not have access to 
a bank account and a mobile payment infrastructure. The assertion that it 
brought banking services to the unbanked is completely unsubstantiated 
and misleading, to say the least. To make this clear, we list the steps 
necessary to conduct payment using Bitcoin in Africa, according to 
Bitpesa’s own terms and conditions. 192 
▪Sender opens Bitpesa Account and purchases Bitcoin; 
                                                          
188 Marina Fyrigou-Koulouri, ‘BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY: AN 
INTERCONNECTED LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR AN INTERCONNECTED 
SYSTEM’ [Case Western Reserve University School of Law] 9 Journal of Law, 
Technology and the Internet 1, p. 7; Philipp Hacker and Chris Thomale, Crypto-Securities 
Regulation: ICOs, Token Sales and Cryptocurrencies under EU Financial Law (2017), p. 23 and 
Gikay Asress Adimi, ‘European Consumer Law and Blockchain based Financial Services: 
A Functional Approach against the Rhetoric of Regulatory Uncertainty’ [Ubiquity Press] 
24 Tilburg Law Review. 
189 Michèle Finck, Blockchains: Regulating the Unknown (German Law Journal 2018), pp. 675, 
677. 
190 Ibid 675, 677. 
191 Ibid 672.  
192 Bitpesa Terms and Conditions, retrieved from <https://www.mybfx.co/terms> 
accessed 11 April 2019.  
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▪Sender authorizes transfer by Bitpesa of a given amount of Bitcoin 
to the designated payee’s bank account; 
▪Bitpesa debits the sender’s account and transfers the specified 
amount fewer charges to the payee’s bank account in local currency; 
▪Bitpesa transfers the money to the receiver’s bank account with 
mobile payment services. 
Obviously, the payment system does nothing special to provide 
banking service to the unbanked. In fact, an unbanked person—someone 
who has no access to a bank account, credit card or debit card, and hence 
is excluded from the financial system193— cannot access Bitpesa payment 
system because local currency account is a prerequisite for the payment 
system to work. In 2015, Bitpesa filed a petition against Safaricom for the 
latter’s refusal to allow the former to use a mobile payment infrastructure 
because it engages in Bitcoin-based transactions, without having a license 
from the Central Bank of Kenya. The Central Bank did not give 
authorization for it did not recognize Bitcoin transfer as money transfer.194  
The dispute clearly shows that Bitpesa needs not only an existing local 
currency account but also mobile payment infrastructure to provide 
financial services in Kenya.  
The example of Bitpesa underlines that not only are the media and 
industry experts spreading technological propaganda but also scholars.  
Without engaging in objective scientific analysis of the technology, the 
intelligentsia risks becoming the mouthpiece for technological populists, 
by merely echo-chambering what the latter propagate.  
4.1.3. REGULATORY OVERSIGHT 
Another important reason for the surge of blockchain as an 
omnipresent and versatile innovation is the thoughtless regulatory 
restraint in certain jurisdictions, especially in the European Union. A 
reasonable restraint from putting in place a drastic regulation that stifles 
innovation is understandable to a large degree.  As Twigg-Flesner suggests, 
a regulatory uncertainty caused by disruptive technologies195 should not 
                                                          
193 Eric Sammons, ‘How Cryptocurrencies like Dash Help the Poor’ Dash Force News 
(August 23, 2017), retrieved from <https://www.dashforcenews.com/cryptocurrencies-
like-dash-help-poor/> accessed 21 October 2018. 
194 Lipisha Consortium ltd and Bitpesa Lted vs Safaricom, High Court of Kenya, 
Constitutional and Human Rights Division, Petition No. 512, 2015, retrieved from: 
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195 Katyal defines disruptive innovation as follows: ‘Disruptive innovation goes beyond 
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trigger the implementation of new legal rules until the disruptive 
technology has also disruptive effect on the law.196 Premature regulatory 
reform may deliver legal rules that are unsuitable or unworkable or 
detrimental to innovation.197  
Nonetheless, unduly prolonged restraint could also have a 
detrimental effect on consumer rights198 and on the smooth functioning 
of the market. Therefore, regulatory authorities, faced with a disruptive 
technology that challenges the existing legal rules should not merely point 
out the potential or actual regulatory uncertainty and sit idly.  At least the 
existing legal rules should be enforced with respect to the technology-
based challenges. This well-established conventional wisdom has been 
ignored by governments in dealing with blockchain-based transactions. 
The degree of regulatory self-restraint differs from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction, which permitted blockchain-based businesses to engage in 
regulatory arbitrage.199  
On the one extreme, there is China, which has declared ICOs 
categorically illegal in 2017.200China considered blockchain-based 
crowdfunding as mostly fraudulent with no sustainable business model 
and concrete product to offer, a sentiment shared by Wikipedia’s founder, 
Wales:  “There are a lot of these initial coin offerings which in my opinion 
                                                          
problems consumers don't know that they have, and ultimately to change the face of 
industry. We are all the beneficiaries of disruption.’ Katyal Neal, ‘Disruptive 
Technologies and the Law’ 102 Georgetown Law Journal 1685, p. 1685. 
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are absolute scams and people should be very wary of things that are going 
on in that area”.201  A report published in 2018 confirmed that 80% of the 
ICOs were indeed fraud.202 China has also been considering banning 
bitcoin mining due to its wasteful electricity consumption.203 
On the other extreme, the EU showed reluctance to apply existing 
regulatory rules to blockchain based transactions until recently.  The EU 
market is peculiarly vulnerable to potential market failure due to lack of 
reasonably robust regulation or regulatory decision pertaining to 
blockchain. Due to the lack of commitment to enforcing existing legal 
rules to ICOs, some ICOs raised funds largely from the EU market.204  
A middle ground is taken by the United States, that adopted a more 
balanced approach by applying the existing legal rules to various 
blockchain based transactions and business entities. The US Financial 
Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCen) issued a guideline that extends 
the application of the Bank Secrecy Act to cryptocurrencies back in 2013 
to cryptocurrency payments.205 The SEC has applied securities regulation 
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to blockchain-based financial instruments (securities).206  On December 
11 2017, the SEC issued a cease and desist order compelling Munchee Inc. 
to return funds raised from investors in return for tokens sold in violation 
of securities law.207  
The EU, while regarded as the model for regulating the market and 
protecting consumers, has tactically been ignoring implementing balanced 
regulatory measure by allowing the technology to serve as a tool for 
anarchy. For a long time, the European Securities and Market Authority 
(ESMA) has been ambivalent about whether the existing legal rules 
governing offer of securities are applicable to blockchain-based assets. It 
provided a positive answer only in January 2019.208 Perhaps more tellingly, 
the European Commission and the Parliament concluded by early 2016 
that the existing Anti-Terrorism and Countering Terrorism Finance 
(AML/CTF) does not apply to cryptocurrency exchanges and digital 
wallet providers. When the Parliament finally decided to implement a 
directive to fill the regulatory gap, which it approved in 2018,209 it extended 
the effective date of the Directive to 2020.210 Until 2020, the Parliament 
and the Commission are willing to let exchange platforms conduct their 
business without complying with obligations as know-your-customer 
(KYC) or report suspicious transactions.  
 Why should a payment service provider transferring 50 dollars on 
behalf of its customer be subjected to the KYC requirement that imposes 
burdensome obligations on the financial institution as well as the 
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customer,211 while intermediaries and users using cryptocurrencies could 
transfer thousands of dollars without being bound by similar 
requirements?  
Compared to China and the US, the regulatory abstinence of the EU 
is the result of either ineffectiveness or regulatory capture. Neither is 
better or worse than the other. What we underline is that the rhetoric of 
blockchain advocates has turned most stakeholders into active defenders 
or passive observers, both categories being enablers. 
5. CONCLUSION: A CALL FOR TECHNOLOGICAL POPULISM 
CONSCIOUSNESS 
The article showed that there are conspicuous similarities between 
populistic discourse and the rhetoric supporting the ‘hype’ of blockchain 
technology, which led us to propose the introduction of a new concept, 
which we called ‘technological populism’.  
Our research revealed that blockchain manifestos are neither 
technological, nor programmatic documents, but mere communication 
strategies resembling populist speeches, meant to attract supporters and 
create polarization. In addition, we delved into the promises of blockchain 
technology and showed that key elements of populist rhetoric, such as 
disruption of the old order, empowerment of ‘the people’ against the 
‘elites’, replacement of compromised institutions are also central to 
blockchain manifestos. However, we also pointed out that the promises 
of blockchain technology find little support in reality and we found that 
the paradoxes of political populism – the potential for misappropriation 
for own profit and lack of substance – are easily identifiable in regard to 
blockchain technology as well. Thus, we debunked the promises of 
decentralization, trustlessness (trust in computation) or 
anonymity/pseudonimity. 
Lastly, we advanced an explanation for the emergence of 
technological populism and the reasons for its success. While accepting 
that multitudes of answers are possible, our article identified and argued 
that two extraneous factors are the most plausible explanation: the wide 
support from the media and the intelligentsia and regulatory oversight. 
The former provided technological populism with the necessary forum 
                                                          
211 D. Hopton, Money Laundering: A Concise Guide for All Business (Gower 2009), p. 78, ‘It 
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and legitimacy. The latter permitted the businesses centred on the 
technology to operate without complying with regulatory standards and 
rule of law, which made it economically efficient to create different 
ventures with no sustainable business model. Ultimately, regulatory 
oversight and indecision created the conducive environment, as populism 
thrives on inefficient institutions. 
All the above prove our initial postulate that similar discursive 
elements and paradoxes connect political and technological discourse, 
which justifies the introduction of the new concept of technological 
populism. As in the case of political populism, a definition of technological 
populism can only be based on its main traits because its confinements 
remain fluid. We, thus, defined it as the phenomenon by which 
technological innovations that promise and promote the disruptive effects 
as societal benefits and claim to solve pressing socio-economic problems 
by empowering the ‘disenfranchised’ and replacing the ‘elites’ are ‘hyped’ 
for the economic and commercial benefits of a select few.  
This begs a final question: quo vadis? What should we do about 
technological populism and how to control or curb its negative effects? In 
our view, the answer to these questions starts with acknowledging the 
existence of the problem. Such first step should enable regulators and 
policymakers to quit their self-induced denial and regulatory stupor and 
act, not just react. We understand that technology will always be one step 
ahead in terms of innovation. Nevertheless, being conscious of 
technological innovations with little real-world relevance, i.e., being able 
to identify and distinguish between genuine benefits and populistic 
promises of technology, should enable regulators to provide adequate and 
timely responses to threats faced by citizens and businesses alike. It would 
also save consumers from investing their hard-earned money into 
technocratic projects that serve only the interests of a select few. 
